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I.

INTRODUCTION

Under what conditions, if any, are state courts justified in making
policy decisions that affect the political process? We live in increasingly
politically polarized times.1 Congress and the President are unable work
together.2 We now see a similar pattern at the state level.3 Paralleling what
† Professor, Hamline University, Department of Political Science and University
of Minnesota Law School.
1. Political Polarization, 1994–2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2017),
http://www.people-press.org/interactives/political-polarization-1994-2017/
[http://perma.cc/H6KB-5BRC] (noting the increased polarization of the American
population over time).
2. See generally SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK (2003) (reviewing over fifty years of legislative history and
deadlock as well as the evolution of congressional response to such deadlock).
3. See, e.g., Boris Shor, How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting
More Polarized, WASH. POST. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon
key-cage/wp/2014/01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarizedin-2-graphs/ [http://perma.cc/YHF8-XRWM]; Patrick Sisson, The Great Sorting Out: U.S.
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has happened at the federal level, state judiciaries are compelled to resolve
disputes, often involving clashes between the other branches of
government, or addressing other salient and controversial policy issues.
Perhaps such a tendency confirms Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation,
“There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one. Consequently, the language of
everyday party-political controversy has to be borrowed from legal
phraseology and conceptions.”4
At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court has famously waded
into the “political thicket” over time5—even addressing contentious issues
such as abortion,6 marriage equality,7 immigration,8 the constitutionality of
the Affordable Care Act,9 presidential appointment power,10 and the
division of powers between the federal government and states.11
States, too, have stepped in to resolve similar issues. For example,
nationally, state courts led the way when it came to legalization of same-sex
marriage,12 addressing issues of voter fraud and identification,13 or partisan
gerrymandering14—even where the Supreme Court demurred or got
involved later. Over time, scholars have questioned both the legitimacy of
the federal courts15 and their capacity to intervene in these types of policy
or political disputes.16
Cities

Polarized Along Income, Education, CURBED (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.curbed.com/2018/4/4/17198384/real-estate-study-migration-united-states
[http://perma.cc/GM8A-TX5K].
4. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, trans. George Lawrence,
270 (1988).
5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding as to malapportionment
that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”).
6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
7. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015).
8. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018).
9. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 520 (2012).
10. See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 515 (2014).
11. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 496 (2008).
12. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
13. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006).
14. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 737 (Pa. 2018).
15. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW
DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1989); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 1 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 3 (Univ. Mich. Press 2004) (1974); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social
Policy, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1977).
16. Although it is not always clear exactly what types of disputes critics declare should
be off limits to judicial intervention or dispute, for the purposes of this article, the scope
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In Minnesota, the courts have been asked to address contentious
issues, as the governor and other members of the executive branch have
clashed with the legislature. There have been judicial requests to fund state
government functions when no budget has been reached,17 to define the
scope of the governor’s unallotment,18 and line-item veto powers.19 There
have also been demands to address separation of powers issues
demarcating the power of the legislature versus the state auditor,20
questions invoking the single-subject rule,21 whether the lieutenant
governor can simultaneously serve in the Minnesota Senate,22 or even
regarding the adequacy of funding and segregation in schools.23 Each of
these cases endeavor to bring the judicial branch into the middle of
political-legal controversies. In some situations, courts have waded into the
political thicket; in others they have not, employing a variety of “passive
virtues,” such as standing or jurisdiction, to avoid the question.

will be the types of disputes included in inter-or-intra-branch conflicts (e.g., disagreements
between the legislature and the governor), or policy matters that look like they require
discretionary or political decisions to be made by branches that are subject to electoral
accountability. For a general discussion of the criticism of what it means for courts to make
policy or intrude into the political process, see: David Schultz, Courts and Law in
American Society, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL
CHANGE, 1, 23 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998).
17. See, e.g., In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of
the State of Minnesota, No. 62-CV-11-5203, 2011 WL 2556036 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29,
2011); In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of
Minnesota, No. C0-05-5928, 2005 WL 6716704 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 23, 2005); In re
Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota,
No. C9-01-5725, 2001 WL 36369516 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001).
18. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 368 (Minn. 2010).
19. Compare Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (2017)
(holding that the Governor’s exercise of his line-item veto power on appropriations to the
Legislature complied with the plain language provision of the state constitution; that the
Governor’s line-item veto power does not violate separation of powers by effectively
abolishing the Legislature; and that judicial restraint prevented the court from deciding
whether the Governor’s exercise of the line-item veto power violated separation of powers
by unconstitutionally coercing the Legislature), with Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S1-SC-36422 (N.M. S. Ct. May 11, 2017) (dismissing the case on ripeness grounds,
effectively allowing the Governor’s use of a line-item veto).
20. See Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 446 (Minn. 2018).
21. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298–99
(Minn. 2000).
22. See Dusosky v. Fischbach, No. 62-CV-18-254, 2018 WL 389173 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 12, 2018).
23. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2018); Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 299 (Minn. 1993).
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Nevertheless, lurking behind these legal controversies is a democratic
theory question: Should state courts make policy, or otherwise render
decisions, that appear as though they should be entrusted to other
branches of state government?
In effect, how legitimate is it for state courts to resolve these types of
controversies? Examining this issue will be the subject of this article,
demonstrating that problems potentially limiting federal courts do not
apply to state courts. As a result, the latter may have more legitimacy and
perhaps capacity to address political or policy issues than the former.
However, state judiciaries face unique problems that the federal courts do
not, specifically when they involve elected judges.
In order to examine the legitimacy of state judicial policy making, this
article will do several things. First, it will provide an overview of American
democratic-constitutional theory as it applies at the federal level, seeking to
clarify the problem that courts at this level face when they issue opinions
that might be characterized as policy making. Specifically, it addresses both
a normative issue—what has been called the counter-majoritarian
problem—and a capacity issue—whether the federal courts have the ability
or skills to make policy. After defining the lines of debate at the federal
level, this article turns to state courts and constitutional theory, arguing that
they are in a different situation than federal courts, both by virtue of the
nature of their own constitutions and, in the case of thirty-eight states,
having an elected judiciary. Elected judiciaries, however, generate a
different problem—the majoritarian dilemma—a source of both legitimacy
and illegitimacy.
The majoritarian problem is a vexing and perhaps unsolvable
problem for some state courts, but that problem does not take away from
a democratic theory of state courts to intervene in political disputes in ways
that depart from the federal courts. This article concludes that there needs
to be either a general or state-specific theory of judicial review that
describes when it is appropriate for state courts to intervene in political
disputes.24
II. AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC-CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Democracies have their own unique value structures. Each
democratic society defines itself, including “its object of inquiry, the critical
components of what makes a political system work, and what forces,

24.

Supra note 16.
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structures, and assumptions are core to its conception of governance.”25
The ontology of a democracy is what distinguishes it from other types of
political regimes. Democracy defines not only the basic structure of how
institutions are supposed to operate, but the political theory or set of
values behind them that describe what these institutions are supposed to
do. Theory, or at least democratic theory, defines institutions and their
functions. This is the essence of what a constitution is and does, thereby
connecting political theory to constitutional law. There are five “criteria”
for a democracy: (1) voting equality; (2) effective participation; (3)
opportunity for enlightened understanding; (4) control of the decisionmaking agenda; and (5) intrinsic equality.26 To understand American
constitutional theory, especially at the national level, a brief discussion of
American democratic theory is necessary.27

A.

The Americanization of American Democratic Theory

There are two democratic theory traditions in the United States. The
first is known as Madisonian democracy (named after James Madison),
and the other is the pluralist tradition, originating in post-World War II
political science.28 Both can be credited to American history, particularly
the disputes between the American colonies and England. They also both
share a common concern with the issue of how to limit abuses of power.
However, the focus on Madisonian democracy’s core assumptions is most
relevant to the arguments here. At root, the American Revolution involved
a dispute over three political terms: representation, constitutionalism, and
sovereignty. The real revolution was over the meaning of these terms and
how they affected American political perceptions and democratic
participation.
Begin with the concept of representation. One of the primary
objections the American colonists had with British rule was the taxation of
tea and other goods. Through this, the famous saying “No taxation without
25. David A Schultz, The Phenomenology of Democracy: Putnam, Pluralism, and
Voluntary Associations, in SOCIAL CAPITAL 74 (Scott L. McLean, David A. Schultz &
Manfred B. Steger eds., 2002).
26. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1990).
27. For a more detailed discussion of the elements of an American democratic
theory of election law, see DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
ch. 2 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014).
28. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Making of the Postwar Working Class: Cultural
Pluralism and Social Structure in World War II, 51 THE HISTORIAN 42, 42 (1988)
(“[World War II] ended a half century of ethnic and religious division and ushered in a
generation of consensual politics and social homogeneity.”).
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representation!” was born.29 In making this assertion, Americans argued
that they did not elect anyone in the British Parliament—the body that
voted on taxes and other policies affecting America—thus, they had no
representation.30 The British did not understand this argument and
asserted that the interests of the American colonies were virtually
represented in the Parliament.31 In one of the first political conflicts
between the Colonies and England, the two sides used the same word—
representation—but meant very different things. Americans demanded a
direct and real voice in Parliament over their own affairs. The British,
however, refused to allow such a change.32
A second debated concept was that of political sovereignty, which
refers to the ultimate administrator in charge of a state or nation. For the
British, sovereignty resided in Parliament.33 American colonists, however,
took a different view: ultimate sovereignty resided with the people.34
Relying on this perspective, the colonists believed they were entitled to
influence over taxation, the control of their own representatives, the
selection of their governors and judges, and other affairs that affected their
lives.35 On July 4, 1776, it became clear that the thirteen states in North
America were sovereign; they were their own country and entitled to rule
themselves.36

29. Lord Camden, Speech on the Declaratory Bill of the Sovereignty of Great Britain
over the Colonies, in LONDON MAGAZINE, Feb. 1768, at 89.
30. Letter from John Hancock, Joseph Jackson, John Ruddock, John Rowe, and
Samuel Pemberton to all Massachusetts Counties (Sept. 14, 1768),
https://www.notaxationwithoutrepresentation.com/ [http://perma.cc/N3SH-LEY5] (“Taxes
equally detrimental to the Commercial interests of the Parent Country and her Colonies,
are imposed upon the People, without their Consent.”).
31. See JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (1989) (“Edmund Burke got carried away. ‘This is virtual
representation,’ he exclaimed of the representation of interests. ‘Such a representation I
think to be in many cases even better than actual. . . .’”).
32. Id. at 43.
33. See generally RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1986); JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN
LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES (1980). British thinkers such as John Locke had argued
against claims by the King that sovereignty was lodged in the monarchy. This was essentially
the argument between Sir Robert Filmer and John Locke. ASHCRAFT, supra.
34. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, ESSAY ON SOVEREIGNTY (1835),
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-02-02-02-3188
[https://perma.cc/65NF-MK27].
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”).
36. Id.
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Finally, constitutionalism is an ancient term, originally describing the
idea that a particular ruler or regime’s actions could be illegitimate
according to ancient laws or norms.37 Over time, constitutionalism came to
be defined as “a government of limited powers, one which often must
adhere to rule of law, procedural due process or regularity, and eventually
to a commitment to the protection of individual rights.”38 During this time,
the British equated the Parliament with the Constitution, meaning that
Parliament defined what was constitutional.39 Unlike the British,
Americans believed a constitution should be distinct from the government
and define the powers to which a government was entitled.
Familiar with the abuses of a monarchy, Americans took it upon
themselves to define terms, such as representation, that would reflect their
new country’s values.40 Defining these terms would affect American
democratic theory for centuries to come. As one example, those opposing
female suffrage had a difficult time asserting that virtual representation was
adequate when direct representation is such a fundamental principle of the
American Constitution.
This experience with the British was not the only factor that defined
the ideologies that would eventually be incorporated into the Constitution
of 1787. Other factors included a Lockean tradition favoring equality,
individual rights, and a secular, limited government;41 a religious Pilgrim-

37. Jacob T. Levy, Ancient Constitutionalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/ancient-constitutionalism [http://perma.cc/CY7D-ZVSR].
38. JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 5–10 (David
A. Schultz ed., 2002).
39. See MICHAEL GORDON, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UK
CONSTITUTION: PROCESS, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY, 13 (2015).
40. Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 CIN.
L. REV. 1499, 1567 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]ncreasingly Americans were
thinking that consent was a continuous, everyday process rather than merely an ultimate
check on government. Representation was increasingly seen as a substitute for legislation by
direct action of the people.”).
41. See generally JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS:
VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984) (analyzing the
motives of American politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals as they assessed their
respective moral responsibilities); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA:
AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 7–9
(1955) (discussing the Lockean influence on the development of the Constitution); GUIDO
DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (R.G. Collingwood trans.,
Beacon Press 1959) (1927) (comparing historical forms of liberalism with a focus on 19
century Europe).
th
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Puritan tradition favoring religious liberty and human fallibility;42 and a
republican tradition emphasizing a commitment to popular government,
support for a belief in a public good, and a fear of corruption rooted in a
concern about how wealth affected political power.43 Finally, there was a
legal tradition credited to William Blackstone, which endorsed a
commitment to rule of law.44 These values played a significant role in the
development of the governing documents of the United States, including
the 1781 Articles of Confederation.45 The Articles emphasized a
decentralized political system. Nevertheless, the Articles should be
considered a first draft because they did not fully address the country’s
financial needs or the states’ veto powers.46
Indeed, the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention took place in
1787 because many felt that the Articles needed revision. However,
tension existed; many Americans feared a strong national government, but
the Articles had not provided enough authority for government to carry
out needed functions. Thus, the framers sought a balance.

B.

Madisonian Democracy and the Problem of Politics

It is important to understand what the framers intended to
accomplish upon drafting the Constitution. The Federalist Papers provide
42.

See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION

MEN WHO MADE IT (1989) (analyzing the idealogy of historical figures and their
impact on the American political tradition); WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF
FRATERNITY IN AMERICA (1973) (discussing puritanism and its influence on the idea of
fraternity in America); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1965) (describing the American mind from its
beginnings in Puritan New England).
43. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (discussing early Americans’
commitment to republicanism); THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN
REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988) (describing the evolution of republicanism in America);
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) (positing a connection between in the early
sixteenth century Florence, English-Civil War Britain, and the American Revolution).
44. See generally BLACKSTONE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER
(Mary Sarah Bilder et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the ways in which American legislators and
judges reinterpreted the English common law to work in with the new American republic);
PERRY MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR
(1961) (analyzing the experiences of American intellectuals that went into the establishment
of a distinctly American identity).
45. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
46. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
AND THE
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some guidance—they reflect an urgent concern to limit the constraints on
government.47 In total, eighty-five essays were written to encourage
replacement of the Articles of Confederation with a new, more federallyfocused constitution. The Federalists argued for a centralized government
on grounds that it would meet the needs of a new republic.48 Specifically,
the new constitution could manage any political factions that would
threaten the separation of the colonies.49
Moreover, the Federalist Papers provide the political theory, analysis,
and philosophy behind the Constitution. One scholar suggests that the
Federalist Papers essays written by Madison provide insight into his views
of how the Constitution would operate.50 While the Federalist Papers
arguably may have been political propaganda for the new constitution,51
they still provide a glimpse into what might have been intended for the
Constitution.
The Federalist Papers, importantly, provide thorough analysis of the
intersection between human nature and democratic politics. Alexander
Hamilton noted, “The science of politics, however, like most other
sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various
principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or
imperfectly known to the ancients.”52 Hamilton, along with Madison and
Jay, believed that their analysis was based upon a solid study of politics. In
their work, they sought to describe how best to divide political power,
check political excess, and assure accountability to the people.53 In short,
they sought to preserve the principles of popular or republican
government and place them on firmer footing.54

47. Letter from James Madison to James K. Paulding (July 23, 1818), reprinted in
THE
WRITINGS
OF
JAMES
MADISON
1808–19
(1908),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-8-1808-1819
[https://perma.cc/GU93-Q3MF] (“The immediate object of [the Papers] was to vindicate &
recommend the new Constitution to the State of [New York] whose ratification of the
instrument, was doubtful, as well as important.”).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
50. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Madison’s Full Faith and Credit Clause: A
Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 125, 125–26 (2011).
51. Stephen G. Kurtz, Rereading The Federalist Papers, WASH. POST (Jan. 25,
1981), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1981/01/25/rereadin
g-the-federalist-papers/047762d8-25a7-4d16-807a-c5ba306bda4d/[https://perma.cc/5ZRYFWKP].
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48, 49 (James Madison).
54. Id.
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When examining public opinion, Madison claimed, “all governments
rest on opinion.”55 Democratic government does this, as it should aim to
derive consent from its people. As Abraham Lincoln famously concluded,
the government should be “of the people, by the people, for the people.”56
However, while public opinion is often seen as an asset to democracy, it
also can weaken the institution.57 Madison wrote that a government should
not often make appeals to popular sentiment to resolve political issues.58
He reasoned that groups of people can turn reasonable opinions into
restless sentiment and unruly passion, and that public opinion can be
unstable.
Hamilton similarly pronounced, “[M]en are ambitious, vindictive,
and rapacious.”59 These feelings should not rule the government; instead,
some mechanism is needed to calm individual sentiments before making
public choices. Individuals are generally motivated by reason or virtues of
something larger than themselves.60 Likewise, Madison wrote, “If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary.”61 As these passages illustrate, the Federalist Papers are based
on human psychology—specifically, the notion that humans are selfinterested. Because humans cannot always be expected to be fair or
selfless, a sound government is crucial.
The solution—arguably the genius—of American politics may be in
encouraging diversity. At one point, the country, like Madison, seemed to
believe that the power of majority rule should control threats posed by
minority groups.62 Yet, the real issue was how to prevent majoritarian
opinions and factions from dominating.

55.
56.
57.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
Emma Green, The Downside of Democracy: A 1979 Book on Presidential

Selection Inadvertently Predicted the Rise of Trump—and the Weakness of a Popular
Primary System, THE ATLANTIC (May 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archi
ve/2016/05/the-downside-of-democracy/484415/ [http://perma.cc/6FMS-UB2L].
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
60. Emily Esfahani Smith, There’s More to Life Than Being Happy: Meaning
Comes From the Pursuit of More Complex Things Than Happiness, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
9, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/01/theres-more-to-life-thanbeing-happy/266805/ [http://perma.cc/MEX5-QU24] (explaining prominent psychologist
Martin E. P. Seligman’s perspective that “you use your highest strengths and talents to
belong to and serve something you believe is larger than the self”).
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
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According to Madison, the political society needs to address three
competing goals: the preservation of a republican form of government,
individual liberty, and limitation on the threat of factions to both
republican government and individual liberty.63 Factions, if composed of a
numeric minority, can be handled by majority rule and elections. In other
words, the majority will continue to rule based on popular vote. The actual
issue, though, is what to do with a faction that constitutes a majority.
Madison argued that the issue is how to control their actions:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of
other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights
against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.64
Phrased otherwise, the question, as Alexis de Tocqueville would later
ask, is how can the American republic deal with the threats of the tyranny
of the majority?65 Or, in other words, how can majority rule be balanced
with minority rights? How does one allow for majority opinion to rule, as
it should in a popular government, but not let it become destructive, acting
impulsively or rashly when threatened? Madison believed the solution was
three-fold: “(1) direct citizen control for representatives; (2) political
homogeneity for diversity; and (3) a small democracy for a large
republic.”66
The first change from classical republicanism identified by Madison
is limiting direct access to the political system. This allows level-headed
individuals to represent the masses and avoid irrational action.67 For
Madison, such a government would provide a balanced assessment of
public opinion, and thus could improve the public good.68 The second and
third changes Madison suggested are closely related, as it would be
impossible to combine or rid factions, inequalities, or diversities without
obstructing liberty. These groups and differences will always exist. Size and
diversity must increase in the government itself. Put another way, the

63.
64.
65.
66.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

Id.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra

note 4, at 250–53.
KENNEDY & DAVID SCHULTZ, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 84 (2011).
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
68. Id.
SHEILA

PUBLIC
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smaller a democracy, the easier it would be for a faction to dominate. In
Madison’s words:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other.69
This technique involved not just allowing a thousand factions to
bloom, but using these factions to counteract one another—letting ambition
counteract ambition and faction check faction can control the threat of
factions.70 The solution to constraining the distortion of faction and tyranny
of majoritarian opinions lies in limiting the access of these groups to all the
tools they need to oppress others. It lies in complicating the processes by
which these groups form without ever restricting liberty or denying their
right to form associations.
Madison and the other authors of the Federalist Papers describe
additional mechanisms to address the threat of majority factions. All are
directed toward making it harder for majority factions to form, or if they
do form, to make it difficult for them to gather and exercise political
power in a destructive fashion. There are numerous pieces to the puzzle
directed at breaking up political power and frustrating a majority from
taking political control. In Federalist no. 51, Madison connects self-interest
to government, arguing that if one can link constitutional power or duties
with institutional and individual self-interest, the competition among the
three branches of government will serve to check them against one
another,71 and thus “balance” their relative power.72 For example, Congress
generally is unable to pass laws on its own without approval from the
President. Likewise, the President cannot bring the country to war without
Congress’s permission, and the judicial branch is presumably unable to
pass laws.73 No one branch exclusively possesses all the power necessary to
run the country.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
See, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS passim (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., 1989).
73. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (providing that the President is the Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces); see also id. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress to declare war); id. at art.
III, § 1–2 (providing that there is no enumerated power of the judiciary to pass laws).
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Furthermore, none of the branches were intended to be dominant.74
To this end, a bicameral Congress was created to balance legislative
power. The election timelines for the House and Senate, two versus six
years respectively, also were intended to prevent any single faction from
taking control. Each of the above-mentioned measures were taken to
prevent a majority faction from taking power over the government.
Federalism further checks political power. In a way, it serves as a
fence or border to control factions. A group of citizens may exert great
influence or control over a state government, but the federal government
would be yet another hurdle for that faction to conquer. Federalism
ultimately breaks up political power. Thus, the Federalist Papers provide
insight regarding how to abate the problems that majority factions present
without violating individual liberties.
The Constitution provides a possible mechanism for controlling the
power of majority factions. Instead of seeking to suppress groups, it uses
certain techniques to disperse political power, including: interest
competition in a heterogeneous and enlarged political society,
representation, bicameralism, checks and balances, separation of powers,
and federalism. In sum, the goal is that political power will check itself and
that no group will have the power to rapidly change the system.75
The goal of Madisonian democracy is to avoid tyranny—to avoid
potential situations where power is concentrated and can threaten
individual liberty. Ultimately, it is premised on the idea that a real
substantive public good does exist. The constitutional machinery that
Madison proposed is meant, in part, to clear away those forces that
threaten representatives and the political process from articulating the
public good. The legislative process, so to speak, is polluted when factions
or special interest groups exercise adverse political pressure. Thus, checks
and balances, separation of powers, and federalism, among other values,
are all aimed at solving the problems of politics and creating a republic
that can pursue or discover the public good.
A faction-ridden political process is a threat to individual rights and
the public good. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this model of
protecting rights relied upon the political process. The Constitution’s logic

74. See id. art. I–III (establishing a bicameral legislature, executive branch, and
separate judiciary). See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (arguing that because the constitution does
not adopt freestanding separation of powers, interpreters should “determine the allocation
of power by asking how it is effectuated by particular clauses.”).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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almost transformed the political process into a big machine.76 Each
constituent—such as Congress or the courts—had a particular role in it. The
original constitutional solution was to use the political process to police
itself against majority factions.
Despite its rationale, the Madisonian model has flaws, such as
assuming that a larger political system might prevent larger factions from
forming. While at one point that may have held steady, in an era of
cellphones, the internet, and social media, factions are easily formed.
Another problem with the Madisonian model is the premise that minority
factions cannot constitute a threat. Majority rule was intended to address
the problem of these smaller factions. But small, well-organized groups
can be powerful. These groups can play an outsized role in politics.77
Organizations such as the National Rifle Association, the American
Association of Retired Persons, and others exercise disproportionate
influence in the American political process. While they may be minority
groups in numbers, they use lobbyists and political contributions to
exercise significant influence. Moreover, as Carolene Products illustrates,
there are various forces that can cause the political process to close down.78
Nonetheless, the point here is that the political process does not always
operate properly, and it may malfunction. What to do? Enter James
Madison.
The Founders anticipated this problem and grappled with it when
they met in 1787. Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison, favored replacing the Articles of Confederation with a new
constitution that would strengthen the central government.79 They
reasoned that replacement would provide a more effective method for
regulating commerce, supporting the union, and uniting a common

76. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1987).
77. See generally BENJAMIN G. BISHIN, TYRANNY OF THE MINORITY: THE
SUBCONSTITUENCY POLITICS THEORY OF REPRESENTATION (2009) (discussing how the
desires of subconstituencies often outweigh the desires of the majority); MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965) (explaining how a large group with a common interest does not automatically give
rise to collective action without individual incentive).
78. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938)
(“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103–104 (1980).
79. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 16, 17 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 18, 19, 20 (Alexander
Hamilton & James Madison).
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defense. However, not everyone agreed that the Articles of Confederationbased government was bad or that the new constitution amounted to an
improvement. In particular, the Anti-Federalists feared that the new
government would become too powerful and that it would threaten
individual rights.80 As a result, they insisted there be a bill of rights.
In Federalist no. 84, Hamilton dismissed the need for a bill of rights,
arguing that to include one would be to assert that there were some powers
that the national government did not possess.81 Hamilton’s arguments were
unsuccessful.82 Many state legislatures adopted calls for bills of rights as
they ratified the new constitution.83 Eventually, James Madison relented,
promising to introduce a bill of rights in Congress if the new constitution
was adopted.84 The states ratified the Constitution, and Madison kept his
promise. He offered seventeen amendments in the House of
Representatives in 1789. Ten of these amendments became the Bill of
Rights upon ratification in December 1791.85
Adoption of the Bill of Rights was not only a triumph for the AntiFederalists, but also a conceptual and perhaps de facto recognition that the
political process alone cannot police itself to protect rights. The adoption
of the Bill of Rights represented a significant shift in how the national
government was to operate. As originally envisioned in the Federalist
Papers, the political process would be governed through a system of
checks and balances, separation of powers, and other constitutional
mechanisms. Although this process defended individual rights and the
public good, the Anti-Federalists still believed individual rights needed
specification.86 As Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson stated in West
Virginia v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
80. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If
Anything, From the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 855 (2001).
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
83. See LIBERTY AND ORDER: THE FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE 15 (Lance
Banning ed., 2004).
84. NCC Staff, On This Day: James Madison Introduces the Bill of Rights, CONST.
DAILY (June 8, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-james-madisonintroduces-the-bill-of-rights [http://perma.cc/N8X5-U7YW].
85. Id.
86. See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (providing a historical context for
constitutional debates as well as criticisms of a centralized government with implications on
the broad expanse of such power).
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them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections.87
The adoption of the Bill of Rights was a major change in how
American democracy and the judicial branch operated. It addressed the
majority faction problem very differently from the original Constitution.
Neither elections nor politics should be potential threats to individual
rights; the latter are not protected by the political process; rather, they are
protected from it. If by some chance laws are adopted that threaten such
rights, it would be the federal courts—made up of individuals not directly
elected by the people—who would enforce and protect rights. Thus,
protection of rights shifted from the regular political process described in
the Federalist Papers, to a clear statement of individual protections
defended and defined by the judiciary.

C.

A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review

Madisonian democracy, then, is premised upon a substantive belief
that a public good exists which needs to be protected from the tyranny of
the majority. It develops a twofold distinction which says that in most
situations, majorities get their way, but in some, they do not. When
minority rights are threatened, the courts step in to protect them. Of
course, there are debates regarding who constitutes a minority deserving
protection and under what circumstances protection should be granted,
depending on, for example, what types of rights are affected.88
Legal scholars debate whether the constitutional framers sought to
protect economic rights and property interests or the civil rights of
“discrete and insular” minorities, as understood in a post-footnotenumber-four-Carolene-Products constitutional order.89 Moreover, some
have argued that Madisonian democracy has been replaced by pluralism
as the dominant theory of American democracy.90 The latter placed
greater emphasis upon the role of group competition and bargaining as a
mechanism to limit and distribute political power,91 but it fundamentally
87. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
88. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107, 147 (1976).
89. ELY, supra note 78, at 100–105.
90. See, e.g., Edwin L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. Pa. L.R. 711, 781
(2001).
91. Id. at 741.
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agreed with the Madisonian concern of addressing abuses of power by
groups.
Whether it be Madisonian democracy or pluralism, it is fundamental
to American democratic-constitutional theory that policy decisions should
be made by electorally accountable institutions such as Congress and the
President, reserving to the federal judiciary the protection of individual
rights. American democratic-constitutional theory balances majority rule
with minority rights.
In performing this task, federal courts perform a crucial role. As
Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”92 Under Marbury, the power of judicial review is in determining
whether laws are valid under the Constitution.93 Or, as Alexander
Hamilton declared in Federalist no. 78, the power of the judiciary extends
to “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”94 The dilemma for
the federal courts is a delicate one. They must render judgments regarding
the constitutionality or meaning of laws, while not crossing a line into
actually making policy. Crossing this line implicates two issues: capacity
and legitimacy.
Capacity raises questions regarding the institutional ability of the
courts to make policy. There is a long-running debate addressing this
issue, raising questions over whether the federal courts have affected social
or political change, or managed it correctly when it comes to issues such as
desegregation and abortion.95 Whatever questions there are regarding the
capacity of the courts to affect and oversee policy change, there is a more
fundamental question regarding the legitimacy to do so. This raises what
Alexander Bickel labels as the “counter-majoritarian” problem.96
Alexander Bickel declared, “judicial review is undemocratic” because
“it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but
92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
93. Id. at 180.
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1–21
(1977); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 178 (1994); RABKIN, supra note 15, at 260, 268;
ROSENBERG, supra note 15 passim; Schultz, supra note 16 at 1–10; David Schultz &
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment of
Rosenberg’s the Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J. L. & POL.
63 passim (1995).
96. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (2d ed. 1986).
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against it.”97 The thought Bickel conceived here is that judicial review as
employed by the federal courts is “counter-majoritarian.”98 Specifically, the
problem is that judicial review can be undemocratic because it gives
unelected judges the authority to make decisions that nullify or thwart the
choices made by those electorally accountable and picked by the people.
If democracy is about majority rule as represented by policies made by
those who are elected by the people, then to let the federal courts prevent
the expression of that will seems undemocratic.99
Bickel’s claim has formed a conundrum for legal scholars.100 There
are many ways to unravel it. One is to contend, as Kenneth Arrow101 and
Robert Dahl102 have done, that there is no way to aggregate majority
preferences in a democracy, that it really consists of “minorities rule,” or
that Madisonian democracy has been overlaid with a pluralist structure
such that majority rule does not exist. Another way is to assert that the
class and economic nature of American capitalism renders majority rule
but an illusion.103 Additionally, Bickel may have simply misunderstood the
nature of American democracy. Contrary to Bickel’s claim, American
democracy is a constitutional one, expressing liberal values, and set up
from the start to balance majority rule with minority rights.
Bickel’s argument is an institutional design claim. It seems to rely
upon a classic formal distinction—and a false dichotomy—between policy
and rights. Policy is the job of the elected political branches, and courts are
supposed to protect rights. This approach assumes that federal courts are
not political because they are not elected and supposedly above politics.
As a result, courts should not render decisions that second-guess the will
of the majority. The approach also supports an argument that since the
federal courts are not elected, they do not represent the people in the way
that the elected branches do.104

97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 16–17.
See Walt Cubberly, New Foundations for Constitutional Adjudication in State

Court, 24 APP. ADVOC. 425, 427 (2012) (explaining that unelected and life-tenured federal
judges do not represent the will of the majority of the people).
100. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 & n.5 (2002).
101. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
102. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT A
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961).
103. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 252 (2012).
104. BICKEL, supra note 96, at 16.
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Again, there are many problems with these formulations. It is
possible the federal government was never designed to be a pure
majoritarian government.105 The existence of the Electoral College and the
fact that the President is not directly elected by the people supports this
argument. The great compromise of the Constitutional Convention of
1787 is another example; it created a two-house Congress resulting in a
Senate that was not elected, and which was not apportioned on the basis of
population. Further, there is a vast body of administrative law literature
that questions the politics-administration dichotomy and argues that in
reality, unelected government administrators make law and policy.106 Thus,
judicial review constitutes policy making no matter how refined or narrow.
The overall claim here is that one can assert that judicial review in
any form is counter-majoritarian while simultaneously asserting that it is
not, and that in some cases, as John Hart Ely contends, it reinforces
majority rule.107 Even Bickel, referencing Charles Black, pointed to how it
could legitimize majority rule.108 Another argument is that it is not
intuitively clear in a formalistic or realistic sense what it means to be
counter-majoritarian. But having said all that, many consider it illegitimate
for federal courts to employ judicial review, except in the narrowest of
situations, because unelected judges are making decisions that negate
choices made by elected officials.109
Bickel urges restraint when federal courts employ judicial review. He
advocates for them to employ a host of “passive virtues,” such as the
political question doctrine, standing, and jurisdictional tests to

105. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1138 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Because of the Framers’ concerns about placing unchecked power in political majorities,
the Constitution’s majoritarian provisions were only part of a complex republican
structure.”).
106. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 583 (1984).
107. ELY, supra note 78.
108. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 29.
109. Compare Jeremy Waldron, The Core of The Case Against Judicial Review,
YALE L.J. 1346, n. 128 (2006) (“Sometimes the power of judicial review will be exercised
tyrannically to prevent legislatures from according people (what are in fact) their rights.”),
with Daniel O’Cooke, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases:
Michael Perry’s Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 587 INDIANA L.J., 590–92 (1985)
(arguing that although the Supreme Court acts against the majority when it exercises judicial
review of individual rights, protecting individual rights declared by the Constitution gives
the Court “unquestionable legitimacy”).

594

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

institutionally limit their actions.110 He, along with Herbert Wechsler111 and
Robert Bork,112 also advocated for the use of neutral principles to constrain
judicial review and policy making.113 However, there also is a problem in
taking a position that the federal courts should stay out of the political
thicket. Failure to address legal claims arising out of malapportionment,
for example, undermined democracy and majority rule, which required
the Court in Baker v. Carr to reformulate the political question doctrine,
rethink justiciability,114 and take action.115 Thus, when the political process
seems incapable of functioning properly, there is a rationale for judicial
intervention.

D. The Institutional Legitimacy of Federal Judicial Review
To sum it up, there is arguably an institutional legitimacy issue when
unelected federal judges use judicial review in ways that nullify decisions
rendered by the other coordinate branches of the federal government: the
branches are electorally accountable; unelected judges are not. Policy, and
the resolution of policy and political issues, are supposed to be solved by
the latter, not the former. This is the federal judiciary’s countermajoritarian problem. This problem is rooted in the U.S. Constitution’s
structure, which constrains the federal courts through concepts of checks
and balances and separation of powers to question if and when they are
ever permitted to render decisions that ought to be made instead by
electorally accountable institutions.
III. STATE COURTS ARE UNBOUND BY THE FEDERAL MODEL OF
CONSTRAINTS
State judiciaries are both similar and different from the federal courts.
Institutionally, federal courts derive their authority from Article III of the
110. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 11–199.
111. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 passim (1959).
112. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 passim (1971).
113. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 49–64.
114. Jack L. Landau, State Constitutionalism and the Limits of Judicial Power, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2017) (stating that the federal justiciability doctrine has
developed over the last century under the Article III “case or controversy” requirement).
115. 369 U.S. 186, 216–18 (1962). However, even as expanded in Baker, the
Supreme Court did not lift all bars to justiciability but instead expanded somewhat the
limited power of the federal courts to get involved in some matters that Colgrove suggested
were beyond the scope of federal judicial authority.
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Constitution.116 They are subject to the limits of this Article and the overall
Constitution as it imposes limits on the federal government, including
setting up the formal institutional division of labor that places the
responsibility of making policy in the hands of the electorally-accountable
institutions of Congress and the presidency.117
But state courts are different. While states may be subject to the same
sociological pressures, such as the factions that Madison warned about in
Federalist nos. 10 and 51, there may be differences in how federal and
state institutions respond to them. The U.S. Constitution, especially the
Supremacy Clause, still binds state courts,118 and they are subject to review
when they decide on federal questions.119 However, state courts are subject
to different designs that allow them to depart from the federal model in
critical ways.120 For example, state constitutions may allow for their courts
to issue advisory opinions,121 perform functions not normally given to
federal courts,122 or address expanded notions of state action and
jurisdiction that contrast with federal courts.123 State courts also have clear

116. U.S. CONST., art I, § 1.
117. See supra Section C.
118. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 447 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. 304, 359 (1816).
119. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032–33 (1983) (noting that state
decisions rendered on adequate and independent state grounds are not subject to federal
review unless there are federal questions left unresolved by them); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 120–121 (1976) (Brennan dissenting and noting that states could impose higher
standards than mandated by federal law). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490–91
(1977) (discussing the paucity of federal questions presented to the Court prior to a “legal
revolution” whereby state courts became more involved as “guardians of our liberties.”).
120. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 288, 299
(2009).
121. See Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81–82 (1975); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–52 (2001).
122. Perhaps the most notable difference being that state courts are entrusted to
regulate the practice of law including issues of admission to practice, promulgating and
enforcing rules of professional conduct, and attorney ethics disciplinary matters. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 480.05 (2018).
123. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 188. Compare N.J. Coal. Against the War in
the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 770–71 (N.J. 1994), with Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 346–47 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
These two cases are examples of different state and federal approaches to the state action
doctrine.
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authority to order funding to maintain their functions.124 One of the more
significant differences between state and federal courts is that in thirty-eight
states, judiciaries are elected, while federal judges and justices are
nominated by the president, subject to advice and consent (i.e.
confirmation) by the Senate.125 These differences are significant—they
speak to the counter-majoritarian issue.

A.

State Courts and the Counter-Majoritarian Problem

State courts operating under their own constitutions might not face
the same legitimacy issue that the federal judiciary does. For the federal
judiciary, the counter-majoritarian problem resides in the fact that judges
and justices are appointed under a constitution of limited powers. These
jurists run the risk of making policy that displaces or voids majoritarian
preferences when they make decisions. There is a fine line between
interpreting the Constitution and articulating policy under a separation-ofpowers system that delegates policy making to the electorally accountable
branches of the government.126 In a constitutional system of limited and no
inherent powers, federal courts run the risk of the counter-majoritarian
problem.127
State courts are not as likely to face this problem. Depending on the
state constitution, state judiciaries may be empowered to do certain things
that the federal courts cannot.128 Simply put, state jurisprudence might
dissolve the counter-majoritarian problem for state courts because their
institutional designs are different.129
Moreover, the election of judges in thirty-eight states might provide
additional endorsement for judicial intervention. Electing judges might
give them the authority or legitimacy to intervene into the political process
in ways that unelected judiciaries cannot.130 Elections render judges directly
accountable to the public, giving the public a check on the judicial branch

124. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 160 (2011); In re Clerk of Court’s
Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 308 Minn. 172, 177–78, 241 N.W.2d 781,
784–85 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tate, 274 A. 2d 193, 199–200 (Pa. 1971).
125. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725–26 (1995).
126. Schultz, supra note 16, at 2–3.
127. See Croley, supra note 125, at 711; see Bickel, supra note 96, at 16–17.
128. See Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La.
Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005) (discussing differences in how state and
federal courts perform functions, including judicial review).
129. See Croley, supra note 125, at 713.
130. Id. at 709, 713.
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if they do not like the decisions rendered.131 Judges, by virtue of being
elected, can claim to represent majorities and can claim their own
independent mandate to resolve political or policy disputes. In effect, if
majorities elect state judges, it is harder to argue that these jurists are acting
in a counter-majoritarian fashion.
Of course, recognizing or acknowledging that judges are majoritarian
runs the risk of turning judges into politicians with robes, perhaps
especially if they also are endorsed in partisan elections. Maintaining
courts as impartial institutions that are above politics is critical to their
public support and legitimacy.132 Ambivalence over whether elected judges
are no different from other elected officials stems, in part, from the
dispute over case law seeking to regulate state judicial elections and
campaign behavior.133 How much do we let judicial candidates do in terms
of campaigning or raising funds?
Resolving the state court counter-majoritarian problem by fully
endorsing judges as elected policy-making officials certainly poses risks.
However, when doing so against the backdrop of a different institutional
design with fewer limits on justiciability, it may be enough to say that there
is no problem with state courts stepping in to resolve state political
disputes. While most state courts do not face the counter-majoritarian
problem as acutely as do federal courts, they face a different problem—the
majoritarian problem.

B.

State Courts and the Majoritarian Problem

Steven Croley declares state courts confront a majoritarian problem
when they elect their judges.134 Croley explains, “[T]he majoritarian
difficulty asks not how unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a
regime committed to democracy, but rather how elected/accountable
judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism.”135 For
Croley, the majoritarian problem that elected state judges face is rooted in
the concepts of constitutionalism located in Madisonian democracy.
131. Id. at 708.
132. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–84 (2002)
(discussing maintaining impartiality as an important governmental interest in regulating
judicial elections and campaigning).
133. David Schultz, Minn. Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial
Selection, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 985 (2006).
134. Croley, supra note 125, at 694 (“[C]onstitutionalism entails, among other
important things, protection of the individual and of minorities from democratic
governance over certain spheres.”).
135. Id.
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In conceptualizing the majoritarian problem, Croley distinguishes
democracy from constitutionalism.136 The former is about majority rule,
whereby “[a]ll qualified members of the political community have an equal
voice in political decisions made by the community, such that political
decisions generating the support of a majority of the community’s
members for that reason carry the day.”137 This contrasts with a concept of
constitutionalism that declares: “Majoritarian authority is limited by the
constitutional rights individuals hold against the majority, such that policies
supported by a majority that contravene those rights, substantively or
procedurally, are for that reason without force.”138 The two are in tension,
if not conflict.
These contrasting traditions of democracy and constitutionalism
arguably can be reconciled if one simply concludes American or
Madisonian democracy is inherently one that declares that majority rule is
tempered by minority rights. Even with that acknowledgment, the dilemma
of when to intervene in the political process still exists for elected
judiciaries. According to Croley:
None of this is to say that constitutionalism cannot be
characterized in a way that renders it compatible with
majoritarian democracy. One might well describe
constitutionalism as the mechanism by which the democratic
majority keeps itself faithful to certain important decisions it
makes. But this recharacterizes rather than escapes the tension
described. For now the conflict is between “the enlightened
majority”—the majority in its constitutional robes—and “the
impassioned majority”—the majority in its everyday dress. . . .
However constitutionalism is characterized, the political
authority of some majority, if not “the” majority, is
circumscribed. That circumscription is commonly justified in
part on the grounds that that majority threatens individual
freedom.139
Part of the majoritarian problem for elected judges is determining
why they should be able to substitute their policy or interpretive
preferences for those expressed by a state legislature or governor.
Furthermore, replacing the judgment of the coordinate branches is part of
the problem with substantive due process. In Lochner v. New York,
Justice Holmes wrote regarding legislative efforts to regulate the economy:

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 701–706.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705–06.

2019] THEORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 599

If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind.
But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.140
His point was to question the legitimacy of the courts in secondguessing decisions that ought to be rendered by the political process
instead. Why should the judiciary “win” when it comes to deciding whose
policy views prevail? If the reason is to consistently favor its views over
those of the other branches, then the majoritarian problem is also one of
conflict of interest. Thus, if an elected court favors its decisions at the
expense of other branches, it runs the risk of compromising impartiality
and neutrality.
But there is a different aspect of the majoritarian problem even more
dangerous: elected judges might sacrifice minority rights in order to get
reelected.141 Accountability to majorities, for Croley, means potentially
compromising the independence needed to make tough decisions, as in
protecting the rights of criminal defendants, abortion rights in pro-life
communities, and defending people of color against racist preferences.142
Making unpopular decisions runs the risk of judges losing the next
election or being investigated by the Senate. Proof of this occurred when
the Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien143 struck down a ban on
same-sex marriages on state constitutional grounds, only to see three of its
judges ousted in the next election.144 This also was illustrated with the
impeachment of the entire West Virginia Supreme Court over charges of
corruption.145 Moreover, similar retaliation at the polls has occurred
elsewhere, such as in California.146

140.
141.
142.

198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Croley, supra note 125, at 726–27.
Id. at 727–28; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html
[https://perma.cc/C8Y6-JCSZ].
143. 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–907 (Iowa 2009).
144. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html
[http://perma.cc/XV7M-6JPB].
145. Doug Criss, The West Virginia House Impeached the Entire State Supreme
Court, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/west-virginiasupreme-court-impeach-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/BQB6-RLGH].
146. See Croley, supra note 125, at 737; see also John T. Wold & John H. Culver,

The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, The Electorate, and the Issue of
Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 passim (1987).

600

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

In addition, the majoritarian problem is not mere conjecture. Studies
have shown that judicial selection mechanisms do affect who is selected as
judge.147 Judicial selection impacts the policy role of state supreme courts.148
In terms of outputs, elected judges seem less likely to overturn death
penalty decisions when state public opinion supports this punishment.149
Other studies have found that judicial elections or selection processes
affect how many opinions partisan or elected judges write or cite,150 how
they rule on abortion in states where public opinion is pro-life,151 how
appellate judges approach criminal matters on appeal,152 and other aspects
of their decisions.153 The main point is that electing judges changes judicial
behavior and decision making, lending powerful support to Croley’s
contention that institutional design does lead to the majoritarian problem.

C.

A Democratic Theory of State Judicial Review

Can we solve this problem? Are state elected courts inherently
majoritarian, and do they face a problem in terms of legitimacy to act?
147. See, e.g., RICHARD WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE
BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT
PLAN (1969); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of
Judicial Selection Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYS.
J. 25 (1979); Elliott Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes: Does
the Process Make a Difference?, 12 AMER. POL. QUART. 225 (1984).
148. G. ALAN. TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION, 56–57 (1988).
149. Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital
Punishment in the American States, in MATTHEW J. STREB, RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 186, 199
(2007).
150. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical
Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 296–97
(2010).
151. See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and
Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 21, 64–65 (2009).
152. See Matias Iaryczower, Garrett Lewis & Matthew Shum, To Elect or to Appoint?
Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians, 97 J. PUB. ECON.
230, 243 (2013).
153. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015); DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT
OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION,
REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic
Voting in State Supreme Courts 54 J. POL. 427 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace,
Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AM. POL. Q. 147 (1992);
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL
STUD. 169, 169 (2009).
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First, if the above literature is correct, then elected judges seem destined to
become majoritarian, and it is unclear if state courts can exercise any
passive virtues to mitigate this problem.154 Being more conscious of
institutional design pressures may not be enough to overcome the forces to
becoming majoritarian. Second, one could argue that majoritarian
preferences are not inherently averse to minority interests, and therefore
there is no real risk of judges disfavoring minority rights. Third, one could
argue that the very process of being elected and being accountable to the
voters places them on par with other elected institutions in terms of checks
on policy excess or errors. Fourth, one might argue that if elected courts
are majoritarian, the solution is making them appointed, as twelve state
judicial systems currently are. But appointed courts may be countermajoritarian.155 Thus, are state courts caught in the dilemma of either being
majoritarian (if elected) or counter-majoritarian (if not elected)? Not
necessarily. Possible resolution of the dilemma resides in crafting an
appropriate theory of democracy for state courts, or reliance upon a stateby-state constitutional and institutional analysis.
As discussed above, Madisonian democracy defined a role for the
federal courts in American society.156 It was a vision that eventually saw the
federal courts as supposed apolitical institutions, confined by checks and
balances and separation of powers, seeking to protect minority rights
against majority rule. One resolution of the counter-majoritarian problem
as posed by Bickel was to say that American democratic theory and
constitutionalism is not simply majority winner-take-all, and that instead,
there is a limited but important role for the federal courts to act to protect
rights. That role is set by constitutional design and, more importantly,
evolving federal precedent. While on occasion one can argue that the
federal courts have overstepped their appropriate role, there is an evolved
body of law that arguably justifies or legitimizes federal courts in upending
majority preferences to protect minority rights.157
Parallel logic can be applied to state courts, although with important
distinctions. First, a different theory of democracy may be required to
justify state judicial intervention in the political process. States, their
constitutions, and courts may not necessarily be grounded in a Madisonian

154. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–76 (2001).
155. See supra Section II(C) & (D).
156. See supra Section II.
157. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006).
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theory of democracy, but instead may reflect different conceptions158 and
constitutional traditions.159 When states began to abandon the federal
model of appointing judges and began using elections in the early
nineteenth century, it represented a different theory of how to structure
democratic institutions. This is the different ontology referred to at the
beginning of this article. It represented a different alignment of separation
of powers and checks and balances that contrasts with what is found at the
federal level.160 State constitutions, and the institutional arrangements that
come with them, contrast with the federal ones—they are more
democratic.161 State courts, in some cases, were designed to be major
policy institutions.162 They often exercise special state powers163 and enforce
state-specific clauses164 that mandate specific functions for states to
perform, such as providing for social welfare,165 education,166 or balanced
budgets.167 Existence of these clauses and positive rights empower state
courts to act in ways federal courts may not. Thus, state courts do not need
to follow the federal separation of powers model.168
The majoritarian criticism of state courts wrongly assumes that they
are supposed to operate the same way and under the same theory as
federal courts. They do not. State courts generally can be viewed as coequals to the other branches of state government in terms of their

158. Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 945, 991–98 (1994); James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional
Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 824 (1991); Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State
Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L. J. 911, 926 (1993).
159. Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions,
12 PUBLIUS 11, 18–22 (1982).
160. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 240.
161. See id. at 31, 299; see also Cubberly, supra note 99, at 426.
162. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 283.
163. Id. at 287.
164. Id. at 267–68.
165. See, e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d. 449, 452–53 (N.Y. 1977).
166. See, e.g., In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974). All fifty states have
some clauses requiring them to maintain some free public school for individuals between
certain ages. See also Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses:
Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33
LAND & WATER L. REV. 281, 294–300 (1998).
167. See, e.g., Wein v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586, 594 (N.Y. 1976); see also RICHARD
BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET
REQUIREMENTS (1996).
168. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 240.

2019] THEORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 603

legitimacy to make policy or get involved in the political process.169 The
political question doctrine, or the concept of justiciability as formulated
and refined in Baker v. Carr, is not necessarily binding on state courts—
they are free to consider issues as justiciable in nature.170 Federal courts,
according to Landeau, have a more limited concept of justiciability than do
state courts:
Federal justiciability doctrine reflects what is often called a
dispute resolution or private rights model of the role of federal
courts. According to this view, federal courts exist to resolve
disputes and nothing else. Their role is not to articulate legal
principles, enforce laws generally, or ensure that the other
branches of government behave themselves within the bounds
of the authority conferred on them by the Constitution.171
Federal justiciability and standing are rooted in the federal case and
controversy requirement. State constitutions do not have this case and
controversy clause.172 For example, Article VI of the Minnesota
Constitution does not have a case and controversy clause that parallels
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and, perhaps as a result, Minnesota
courts have often recognized greater standing to bring cases,173 especially to
protect constitutional rights as they affect the political process.174 Arguably,
Minnesota courts could play a more robust role than federal courts as
evidenced by the existence of Article I, section 8, the remedies clause,
which guarantees that “[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive . . . .”175
169. See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21,
21–54 (1998).
170. 369 U.S. 186, 216–218 (1962). For example, while in Luther v. Borden (48 U.S.
1 (1849)), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal courts would not rule on matters of
what constituted a republican form of government under the Guarantee clause, nothing
would prevent a state court in theory from ruling such a matter to be justiciable under their
own constitution. See also Landau, supra note 114, at 1311, 1317 (pointing out that the
federal judicial power is limited by Article III constraints and that such constraints do not
apply to state courts.).
171. Landau, supra note 114, at 1312.
172. Id. at 1315.
173. See, e.g., McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 1977) (holding that a
taxpayer suing as a taxpayer has standing to challenge administrative action).
174. See, e.g., Moe v. Alsop, 288 Minn. 323, 330–31, 180 N.W.2d 255, 259–60
(1970); State ex rel. Dowdall v. Dahl, 69 Minn. 108, 112–14, 71 N.W. 910, 911–12 (1897).
175. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8. Despite the language used in the remedies clause,
Minnesota courts have not always been receptive to an expansive reading. See State v.
Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 873 (Minn. 2015) (“Although some of our early cases suggest
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In addition to expanded notions of justiciability, state constitutions
depart from the federal constitutional model of separation of powers.176 In
some cases, state courts are partners in governance, not simply private
dispute-resolving institutions.177 They have affirmative powers to enforce
constitutional powers and duties, share in decision making, and ensure
that other branches do their job.178 Unlike federal courts, state courts have
general jurisdiction.179 Additionally, state courts are not limited by federal
concepts related to justiciability.180
A general democratic theory of state courts would begin by
recognizing that all of the precepts of Madisonian democracy do not
necessarily apply to state courts in the same way that they apply to the
federal courts. State courts, whether elected or appointed, may have the
authority to act and render decisions that are majoritarian or countermajoritarian. They may have a legitimate role in making policy decisions—
a majoritarian act—and, at the same time, overturning other elected
institutions as part of their role in enforcing state and federal constitutional
rights—a counter-majoritarian act. Finally, it is important to keep in mind
that part of the problem with federal courts acting in a countermajoritarian fashion is that the U.S. Constitution is a power-creating
document. This means that inherent powers for federal institutions must
be clearly stated in the text of the Constitution or necessarily implied.181
State constitutions are power-limiting documents, which provide
institutions broad authority to act unless otherwise limited.182 This
difference enhances state courts’ authority to act in ways federal
institutions cannot.
A specific democratic theory of state court intervention into the
political process would rest on unique constitutional provisions and case
law within a state. It would empower individual state judiciaries to act on
issues that federal or other state courts might not address because of the
an expansive reading of the Remedies Clause, we have subsequently held that the
Remedies Clause ‘does not guarantee redress for every wrong, but instead enjoins the
[government] from eliminating those remedies that have vested at common law.’” (citations
omitted)).
176. See Landau, supra note 114, at 1320.
177. Id. at 1320–22 (explaining that state constitutions confer much broader judicial
power and “go well beyond the private adjudication model power”).
178. Id. 1311–12.
179. Id. at 1318.
180. Id. at 1325–26.
181. See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 412–22 (1819) (providing a classic
statement on the limits of federal government powers).
182. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 27.
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expanded notions of justiciability and the different role that a state court
has in governance as compared to federal courts.183 States do not face the
same limitations with the political question doctrine as do federal courts,
which allows for a different judicial role within a different democratic
theory.184
This theory would look to issues regarding whether there are clear
separation of powers clauses in a state constitution, specific mandates that
require the government to act,185 other provisions that uniquely declare the
way legislation is supposed to be passed,186 or mandate duties of the
judiciary. These constitutional provisions, as well as case law and
precedent, are all important to declaring and empowering what a specific
state court can do in that state. This suggests that there may not be an
across-the-board theory of democracy or judicial review that guides state
courts regarding when it is permissible for them to intervene in the
political process. Whether a specific state court is justified in intervening in
the political or policy process is dependent on the jurisprudence and
constitutional tradition and values of the state in which it is located.187
Thus, one way of addressing the majoritarian problem is to say that
either a general or specific theory of democracy for state courts permits it.
This option may resolve one aspect of the majoritarian dilemma that state
courts face. Both elected and appointed state courts may be legitimate in
getting involved in the political-policy process. But the other aspect of the
majoritarian problem is specific when it comes to elected judges and how
that institutional design often disfavors minority rights. What do we do
then? Assuming the literature on judicial selection is accurate, the greatest
majoritarian problem facing state courts is that elected judges are less likely
to favor individual rights compared to appointed systems. If that is the
case, the obvious answer is to suggest that elected state judges perhaps run
183. Hershkoff, supra note 154 at 1836–37.
184. Id. at 1862–67.
185. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95
(Wash. 1978) (ordering the legislature to fulfill its constitutional duty by defining and fully
funding “basic education” and a “basic program of education”).
186. MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 17 (“No law shall embrace more than one subject, which
shall be expressed in its title.”).
187. See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the
Record, 6 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 567, 574 (1978) (examining factors that affect state
constitutional interpretation); Williams, supra note 120, 82–86 (reviewing the role of
tradition in state constitutional adjudication and interpretation); Thad B. Zmistowski, City

of Portland v. Depaolo: Defining the Role of Stare Decisis in State Constitutional
Decisionmaking, 41 ME. L. REV. 201, 212–21 (1989) (discussing specific issues on how to
treat precedent in state law).
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counter to a theory of judicial review that emphasizes protection of
minority rights. Simply eliminating elected judges and replacing them with
an appointed bench might be the answer, but the reality is that there is
probably little support for it.
Croley may be partially correct. While state courts may have greater
authority to intervene into political controversies, in some cases they may
pose greater risks to individual rights. The solution, if any, lies perhaps in
crafting specific state constitutional clauses or mandates that direct state
judicial review. The second option is to recognize that state courts may
need to be understood within the context of a federal system, where
judicial federalism establishes a floor of federal rights that may not be
violated by state institutions.188 This suggests that the federal courts may
need to serve as a check on state courts that fail to protect rights.189 The
solution may not be completely satisfactory, but it does ensure that some
of the majoritarian tendencies of elected courts are tempered. Finally,
there is a need for state courts to directly confront this dilemma by
defining limits or strategies regarding how to determine when and how to
intervene in the political process. Thus far, at best, state courts seem more
ad hoc than general in defining a jurisprudence of intervention into the
political process, and further, how such intervention fits into a state theory
of democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
State judicial systems are located in a different political and legal
context when compared to the federal courts. They operate under unique
state constitutions and traditions that often empower and obligate them to
act in ways that contrast to the authority granted to federal courts.
Recognizing these legal and institutional differences may equip state courts
with authority and competence to act on matters that contrast with federal
judicial authority.
State judiciaries may be asked to address difficult political and policy
issues as their coordinate branches become as politically deadlocked or
divided as the federal government. State constitutional traditions, enabling
a general or state-specific theory of democracy or judicial review, may not
only permit, but obligate state courts to act to resolve many of these issues.
188. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 102–103 (2000); Judith S. Kaye, Foreword:
The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of
Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L. J. 727, 738–39 (1992).
189. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96
VA. L. REV. 719, 724–25 (2010).
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